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TheAdministration of Foreign
Trade and Foreign Exchange
since 1961
Practicallyspeaking, all exports and imports were taken over by government
organizations or public enterprises in 1961. Since that time, the volume of
exports and imports, prices, and all foreign payments have been the outcome
of interaction between the Egyptian administration and the "world market."
For a significant part of Egyptian trade and payments, the "world market"
means the actions of the authorities of other countries, Communist countries
in particular. The administration has, of course, been forced to operate within
the constraints of the domestic supply situation, and domestic supply, par-
ticularly in agriculture, is to some extent still determined by market forces.
Domestic demand, on the other hand, influences foreign trade and payments
only to the extent deliberately permitted by the administration.
These circumstances make it difficult to describe the operation of the
system. When everything is left to administrative discretion, only detailed
studies made on the inside can disclose exactly which mechanisms or criteria
are crucial for the decisions made. Unfortunately, we have not been in a
position to study how the system functions from the inside, and with a single
exception,1 nothing has been published about it. Moreover, it is conceptually
impossible to single out the impact of the nationalizations as separate from the
effects of import, foreign exchange, and. other controls. To a considerable
extent foreign exchange allocation has been undertaken by the same ministries
and organizations that administer the nationalized industries.
It is also clear that actual developments in foreign trade and payments
should not be interpreted as simply revealing the preferences of the Egyptian
authorities, for they did not always correctly foresee the consequences of
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their decisions and may have based them on inadequate information. Miscal-
culation has certainly not been absent. And since much of Egypt's foreign
trade has been on a bilateral basis, what has actually taken place may reflect
the relative bargaining position of the countries involved rather than prefer-
ences. Complicating this issue is the fact that, intimately related to the problem
of weapons deliveries, the Egyptian position vis-à-vis the Communist countries
has become increasingly weak. To what extent these countries have taken
advantage of the situation economically is hard to say. For political reasons
they may even have been inclined to subsidize (rather than exploit) Egypt. It
seems clear, however, that had weapons and loans been available to a larger
extent from the West, Egypt's East Bloc trade would have been much more
limited.2
ECONOMIC STAGNATION AND FOREIGN
PAYMENTS COLLAPSE: 1964-1967
Table 5—1 shows some indicators of developments from 1963—64 to 1970—7 1.
The GDP growth rate, which had been 6.4 percent in 1963—64, declined to
4.9 percent in 1964—65, to 4.4 percent in 1965—66, and finally dropped to 0.3
percent in 1966—67. While the outbreak of war in June 1967 may have low-
ered the growth rate for that last year somewhat, it can explain the complete
stagnation of GDP only to a minor degree. With the war, the growth rate
became negative; the closure of the Suez Canal (which normally produced
some 4 percent of GDP), the occupation of Sinai, the evacuation and de-
struction of Suez, Ismaileya, and some minor towns, together with the destruc-
tion of some major industries, including oil refineries and fertilizer plants,
brought about a fall in GDP by 3.1 percent.3 In 1968—69 a recovery by about
6 percent took place, but it did little more than compensate for the fall in
1967—68. For the three years from 1966—67 to 1968—69, the GDP growth
rate averaged only about 1 percent; per capita income must have fallen by
about 6 percent during this period.4
It is usually assumed that it was the mounting foreign exchange crisis
during 1965 and 1966 that brought development (in terms of GDP growth)
to a complete stop around 1966-67—before the 1967 war. The foreign ex-
change crisis (which had been looming since 1961) became acute in 1965,
when the United States abrogated PL480 sales of wheat, and Egypt suddenly
had to purchase large quantities of wheat in currency at a time
when the exchange reserves were exhaustecj,/ The exchange crisis reached
such proportions in 1965 and 1966 that Egypt was unable to fulfill con-
tractual debt service obligations, got involved in short-term financing through








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Foodstuffs 113.6 119.8 110.2 126.1 137.7 91.9
Other consumer goods42.2 33.8 45.3 47.0 32.3 28.9
Raw materials 133.9 153.2 168.1 175.8 106.3 100.5
Capital goods 98.5 107.6 92.3 117.0 67.9 68.3
Total 398.4 414.4 405.8 465.4 344.3 289.6
SOURCE: Economic Bulletin, NationalBank of Egypt, 1970.
the Khedive Ismail would have found immodest, and had to
from both West and East.
ask for moratoria
The payments crisis was a financial matter, of course, but it could have
been expected to lead to a reduction of imports. This was not the case, how-
ever. From 1964 to 1966, total commodity imports remained at a very high
level in relation to GDP (see Chart 1—1), increasing by 12 percent over the
two years, which should have been sufficient for sustaining the growth rate at
a level of 6 percent. Not only is it surprising, therefore, that the authorities
•were able to increase imports in the face of the desperate payments situation,
but also that production suffered from, the payments crisis when imports were
actually on the rise.
Before discussing this matter in some detail, we want to emphasize that
other factors did, in fact, serve to dampen the GNP growth rate from 1964
to 1967.
Both agriculture and industry stagnated, but in both cases exogenous
forces were at work none of which can be traced back to the foreign exchange
crisis. Agriculture experienced very good crop years from 1962 to 1964, and
this helped to create the rather high growth rates of GD? in that two-year
period. From 1964 to 1966, however, the yield of cotton fell by about 20
percent. There was a little "green revolution" in corn, with yield increasing by
about one third. Nevertheless, corn being a much less valuable crop than
cotton, agricultural output and value added stagnated, albeit at a relatively
high level, from 1964 to 1967. In industry, oil production (extraction as well
as refining) fell because certain wells began to run dry, a circumstance that
also tended to create stagnation in the total exports of manufactured products
other than textiles during these years (Table 5—4).Thesame happened with
manganese. In addition, the slowdown in agricultural output alone would have
tended to create stagnation in industries processing agricultural products, such




1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Cotton
Raw 121.0 166.6 146.2 143.4 121.6 121.1
Yarns and fabrics 32.9 31.8 47.0 47.9 47.6 52.4
Rice 19.5 30.4 19.8 21.2 29.8 44.9
Other agric. products 15.2 14.6 14.5 15.3 16.2 13.7
Crude oil and oil
products 20.0 20.9 16.8 15.3 9.1 7.5
Cement 1.2 1.0 2.0 2.3 1.9 5.1
Other 5.6 5.8 5.5 5.1 5.5 6.5
Total 226.8 234.4 263.2 263.1 246.1 270.3
SOURCE: EconomicBulletin, NationalBankof Egypt, 1970.
However, these factors can, at best, only partially explain the stagnation of
industrial production.
The foreign exchange crisis could have worked directly on industrial
production through a decline in imports of raw materials, parts, and ma-
chinery, and through greater maldistribution of the production requirements
actually imported. However, the total value of imports of both capital goods
(including transport equipment) and raw materials continued to rise through
1966, as shown in Table 5—3. Raw materials imports rose by about 15
and capital goods and transport equipment, by about 9 percent, (in value
terms) from 1964 to 1966, while industrial value added at constant prices
rose by only 3 percent from 1964—65 to 1966—67. Relevant import price
indices are not available, but international raw materials and capital goods
prices did not rise markedly during these four years. A unit price index for
total Egyptian imports rose by 3.3 percent from 1963 to 1965,° while the
IMF's import price index for less developed areas rose by 3 percent from 1963
to It seems clear that imports of both raw materials and capital goods
increased much more than industrial production in real terms.
Moreover, data are available which point in the direction of higher stocks
of industrial raw materials and parts during this period. Table 5—5 presents
value figures for inventories in state-owned industrial enterprises. Nothing is
known about the inventory valuation principles applied, but finished products
are presumably at current prices, and raw materials and spare parts, at in-
going prices. It is not clear how goods in process—if at all included—have



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.114 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
with total output value in enterprises employing ten workers and more (which
must include practically all state-owned enterprises but also some private
ones) and the other with total value added at Constant prices in industry and
mining (which includes all private industrial enterprises and handicrafts).
Compared with total output value, there was a clear relative increase in
total inventory value from 1964—65 to 1966—67, whereas during the first five-
year-plan period, 1960—61 to 1964—65, there had been no change in relative
inventory value.8 Almost the whole (relative) increase was in finished prod-
ucts, although relative value of inventories of both raw materials and spare
parts showed a slight increase, too.
In physical terms, inputs of raw materials and consumption of spare parts
can be expected to change roughly in proportion to physical output and value
added at constant prices (unless there is strong pressure on capacity, in which
case at least consumption of parts might increase more than proportionately);
and inventories need not increase fully in proportion to current inputs. Value
added at constant prices in the industry and mining sector increased by 3 per-
cent from 1964—65 to 1966—67. Wholesale prices for industrial materials and
products increased by 7 percent. Assuming that this price index can be used
for deflating the values of both raw materials and spare parts, and identifying
increase of real value added with increase in physical output, one finds a
sharp rise in real inventories relative to real output, not only of finished
products but also of raw materials and parts. There is admittedly more than
one snag in this argument. Presumably, production increased more in state-
owned enterprises than in small private enterprises: raw materials allocations
discriminated clearly in favor of state-owned enterprises. And the assumptions
about prices may be misleading. Nevertheless, it would take a strong
discrepancy in the relative increase of production in public and private enter-
prises, or a shift in relative input and output prices, to upset the conclusion
that relative inventories of raw materials and parts increased somewhat during
the years in which the growth rate of production slowed down. Certainly, it is
beyond a reasonable doubt that relative inventories of finished products in-
creased substantially during these years.
Data for individual industries also point to the accumulation of excessive
inventories of spare parts. The cement industry, for example, which experi-
enced an increase in production from 2.0 million tons in 1960 to 2.3 million
tons in 1965—66, at the same time showed an increase in consumption of
spare parts from £E5.12 million to £E6.15 million (this nominal increase
may have implied a certain fall in real terms), while inventories of spare parts
rose from £E2.l0 million to £E4.99 million.
Thus, looking at the totals of imports and inventories of raw materials
and parts, there is nothing there to help us understand the stagnation of indus-
trial production during the period of the foreign exchange crisis. Totals, how-ADMINISTRATION OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE SINCE 1961 115
ever, tell us nothing about distribution between enterprises. There may be
plenty of inventories—of the wrong things. Indeed, the simultaneous occur-
rence of inventory surpluses and commodity is a well-known phe-
nomenon in the centralized economic systems of the Communist countries.
Would it not be natural for something similar to take place in Egypt, and
perhaps even more so in Egypt than in a Communist country? Also, enter-
prises may have been stockpiling in anticipation of shortages.
Be that as it may, nothing is easier than giving examples of shortages
leading to unintentional production curbs during these years. In 1965—66
superphosphate production declined because of insufficient supplies of pyrites
and sulphur (both imported). Production of rubber tires declined from July
to December 1966 because of the shortage of imported raw materials.9 During
these years, the newspapers—which are often quite outspokenly critical of the
lower levels of government—contained reports of extraordinary accumulations
of import goods in the customs warehouses in Alexandria. Moreover, the
durable consumer goods industries were severely affected by deliberate curbs
on imported components; automobile assembling is the outstanding example.
Thus, there is little doubt that behind the apparently satisfactory import and
inventory totals there were; indeed, commodity and sectoral shortages that
exerted an adverse effect on production.
A striking feature of Table 5—Sisthe sharp absolute and relative increase
in inventories of finished industrial products. In a market economy this would
normally be interpreted as a sign of slack demand. In a controlled economy
it might just mean that a lot of unsaleable rubbish is piling up. But although
domestic purchasers certainly preferred imported goods (apart from cotton
textiles, where Egyptian quality is superior), there is no indication that they
would have chosen to abstain from all buying when only domestic products
could be obtained. We have, then, the last possible explanation of the indus-
trial stagnation: measures to curb private demand and investment were taken
as of 1964—65. Since the situation was one of repressed inflation, however,
it is difficult to find clear indicators of total demand ex ante.
Let us first consider money supply as a demand indicator (Table 5—2).
Theexpansion in money supply, including quasi money (in the terminology
of the IMF), slowed down rapidly during 1965 and 1966. After spurts of 19
percent in 1963 and 15 percent in 1964, the increase was only 7 percent
during 1965 and less than 2 percent during 1966. The corresponding figures
for increases in GDP at current market prices were 12, 18, 9, and 4 percent.
Thus, while some excess liquidity may have accumulated during 1963 (and
earlier), during the following three years liquidity in the private sector showed
a relatively declining tendency. These developments in the money supply do
not exclude the possibility that some deflationary pressure may have emanated
via the private sector during 1965 and 1966.116 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
The course of money wages points in the same direction. While annual
wages increased from 1963—64 to 1964—65 by 17 percent in agriculture, by
9 percent in industry, and by 5 percent in services, the corresponding increases
during the following year were only 4, 3, and 0 percent. Real wages in agricul-
ture rose slightly during these two years, but those in industry and services
fell. Developments in private profits are not known.
The composition of national expenditure, measured as a percentage of
GDP at current market prices (Table 5—1, columns 6 to 9), permits some
further conclusions. The characteristic feature of national expenditure from
1963—64 to 1966—67 isthat gross investment (including stock changes)
shrank from 19.7 to 15.5 percent of GDP, while the foreign deficit fell from
7.0 to 1.0 percent of GDP. Of the improvement by 6.0 percentage points in
the foreign deficit, 4.2 percentage points was (in real terms) by a
decline in gross investment; fixed gross investment even fell as much as 5
percentage points. Gross investment thus occupies a central place in explaining
events. The remainder of the improvemeni in the foreign deficit is related
almost exclusively to the share of public consumption, while private consump-
tion by and large kept its share.
Before analyzing the demand situation, we sound a word of caution con-
cerning the improvement in the foreign deficit noted above. A glance at col. 11
of Table 5—1 shows that the deficit in foreign payments improved less during
the same period. Apart from the deficiencies of the statistics, this apparent
contradiction is most probably explained by the fact that the computation of
the foreign deficit for the national expenditure estimates is based on com-
modity and setyices deliveries in foreign trade (with the exception of weap-
ons),_.wlIereas the foreign payments deficit is a deficit on payments. The
difference would then be the well-known phenomenon of leads-and-lags in
foreign payments, and it is crucial for understanding the payments situation.
From around 1963 to 1966, payments abroad were postponed as the foreign
exchange situation became increasingly strained; when, therefore, purchases
and deliveries of imports were cut down after 1966, payments continued to
run at a high level for some time because deferred payments fell due and could
not be postponed. The alleviation of the payments situation was thus a pro-
longed process and did not occur instantaneously with the reduction of imports.
The diminution in the share of gross investments partly reflects the
government'sdeliberatepolicyof reducing investment expenditure;the
Mohieddin cabinet feltthat expenditure on investment could safely be
reduced without detrimental effects on real investment in the sense of capacity
creation.'° The reduction of investment expenditure goes far in explaining why
a domestic slack should appear with little or no immediate improvement in the
balance of payments in terms of capital goods deliveries, and why the effects on
imports tended to lag behind the domestic measures of demand management.ADMINISTRATION OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE SINCE 1961 117
In the year 1964—65, the decision of the government was not to embark
upon any new investment projects, only to finish projects already started.
Since at the start of an investment project (particularly in industry and elec-
tricity) expenditures are usually concentrated on construction, shifting to
machinery and equipment only later, and since construction is an activity
using domestic materials—whereas machinery and equipment are largely
imported into Egypt—it follows that a decision to cut investments by ref rain-
ing from starting new projects leads to a drop in construction activity and,
hence, in the production of building materials, while capital goods imports
continue and may even rise for some time. This time pattern is well-known
in developed countries and is clearly discernible in Egypt for these years. In
real terms construction activity (measured by value added) fell by 5 percent
from 1964—65 to 1966—67, while capital goods imports increased by 8 percent
during the same period." To some extent the development was fortuitous,
since the Aswan High Dam project happened to pass from the construction
phase to the installation of generators and transmission lines around 1965.
In terms of money value, fixed investment remained constant from 1964—65
to 1966—67; in real terms it probably fell, but in terms of finished capacity it
may quite well have increased in line with the government's intentions. Not
until 1967 did capital goods imports fall, but then the fall was very dramatic
(to less than two thirds), and now real investment fell to a very low level.'2
For the years we are interested in—1964 to 1966—the investment policies
thus created a domestic slack without alleviating the strain on the balance of
payments.
The available data on public and private consumption are less helpful.
Public consumption data (and the foreign deficit) may include payments for
military equipment acquired from abroad, but certainly not deliveries (other-
wise something much more dramatic would have taken place from 1966—67
to 1967—68, when the Soviet Union replaced a very substantial part of the
army's equipment); this fact distorts the size of all shares, and most of all that
of public consumption. Moreover, the only available expenditure data (Table
5—1) are at current market prices, which are particularly deceptive for a
comparison between public and private consumption shares for this period.
About two-thirds of public consumption consists of government wages and
salaries, which were kept unchanged (in principle, at least) from 1964 to
1967, while prices for consumer goods increased much more than other prices,
by about 30 percent from the end of 1963 to the end of 1966 (Table 5—2,
columns 1—3). The almost unchanged share of private consumption at current
market prices thus hides a substantial decline in real terms. The share of
public consumption in real terms, on the other hand, must have declined far
less, and probably even increased somewhat from 1963—64 to 1966—67. How118 FOREIGNEXCHANGE REGIMES INEGYPT,1946—1969
thisshift in the composition of real demand affected private production and
the balance of payments is difficult to say a priori, but it stands to reason that
it must have tended to reduce demand for domestically manufactured products
and perhaps strained the balance of payments. For public consumption con-
sists of direct labor services to a much larger extent than does private con-
sumption; and the Egyptian government, involved in the Yemen War at that
time, probably had a relatively high propensity to import (even disregarding
heavy military equipment, included here only insofar as payments are con-
cerned): the army procurements of food, an important import item, and of
other imported goods probably increased rapidly.
It is more difficult to gauge the shifts in income distribution in the private
sector and their effects on demand for domestically produced manufactures
and import goods or exportables. It is beyond a reasonable doubt that private
sector income distribution shifted strongly in favor of labor during the 1961—
1963 period, when nationalizations, Arab socialism, and other policies of the
Nasser regime dominated the scene (see Chapter 4). But from 1964 on the
picture is less clear. The rise in the cost of living was largely the result of
public enterprise pricing, and to that extent did not serve to increase private
profits. Some increases in producer prices in agriculture did take place, how-
ever, and black market profits probably became more widespread. It seems
possible, therefore, that from 1964 to 1967 there was, indeed, a shift back in
favor of private profits. There is some evidence that terms of trade between
agriculture and manufacturing shifted in favor of agriculture from 1964 to
1967, with the peasantry tending to consume more food, textiles, and fuel,
and little else. How shifts in income distribution within the private sector
generally affect the demand for domestic products and the balance of pay-
ments ex ante is not obvious. The effects may go either way.'3
Possibly all of these factors must be brought into the picture to explain
fully the stagnation of industrial production. Industries processing agricultural
products tended to stagnate because agricultural crops were mediocre. Durable
consumer goods industries declined because supplies of imported components
were deliberately cut down. Private sector liquidity stopped increasing, gen-
erally dampening private demand. Building materials industries suffered from
the change in public investment policy and a decline in residential building.
The shifts in the composition of demand may, at least temporarily, have
affected the balance of payments adversely. On top of all this, the growing
complexity of controls and the increase of red tape generally created imbal-
ances and obstacles to production, inter alia through increased maldistribution
of available imports. However, to quantify the individual impact of all of these
factors does not seem feasible.
A final problem to be considered is the coordination of domestic demand
management measures with foreign trade and exchange policies. ThroughADMINISTRATION OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE SINCE 1961 119
1963—64, a high degree of coordination was possible insofar as the two key
ministries—the Treasury and the Ministry of the Economy (in charge of for-
eign trade and banking, including the central bank)-—-together with the Minis-
try of Planning (a body without any real importance), were gathered under
the same minister. Thereafter, these three ministries were headed by three
different ministers, and coordination of policy may have suffered from this
change. Coordination between ministries has always been a weak point in
Egyptian government, and it became worse during these years when the presi-
dent lost contact with domestic realities and his interest was almost exclusively
directed toward foreign affairs.14 It must not be excluded from our considera-
tion, either, that, at the same time as the Treasury embarked upon an honest
attempt to mop up purchasing power, the foreign trade authorities continued
to consider it their main task to secure higher commodity imports regardless
of the foreign exchange position. Pressures from other ministries and the
natural tendency under a control system for enterprises and authorities to ask
for more than is really needed may have contributed to keeping the issuance
of licenses at too high a level.
The deficit in the balance of current payments during these years was
largely with Western Europe and the United States and therefore a deficit in
convertible currency. Payments vis-à-vis Communist countries were almost
balanced (Table 5—6). Trade with the latter yielded a surplus averaging almost
£E20 million during the years 1961 to 1966, but this surplus was by and
large used for covering payments for deliveries of military equipment from,
and debt set-vice to, the Communist countries. Between one-half and two-thirds
of total imports continued to be purchased from Western Europe and the
United States (the Communist countries being unable to supply wheat, to take
one important item), and during the years 1963 to 1966 the trade deficit with
these countries was on the order of £E150 to £E200 million. About half
of this deficit was covered by revenues from the Suez Canal. The remainder
had to be covered by credits and, apart from some long-term development
loans and PL480 counterpart funds (until 1965), this meant short-term
commercial credits.
Contacts with the IMF led the latter to present in 1966 a "background
stabilization plan" which, among other steps, involved a rise in the foreign
exchange rate by about 40 percent, as well as certain price and tax increases
and a lowering of subsidies on consumer goods. The Mohieddin cabinet seems
to have agreed to the stabilization plan; some further price and tax increases
were actually implemented to reduce private consumption and investments
were further curtailed. But the president considered the devaluation proposal
as an intolerable interference in Egypt's economic affairs, and it led to the
resignation of the cabinet. At this time there seems to have been a clash be-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ADMINISTRATION OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE SINCE 1961 121
particular. Mohieddin seems to have insisted upon a termination of the Yemen
War as the only way of improving the economy.'5
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE 1967 WAR
The outbreak of war with Israel in 1967 changed the picture in several re-
spects. The immediate consequence was a sharp increase in imports (excluding
military equipment) from the Communist countries, with exports to them re-
maining almost unchanged. But after 1968 the tendency was reversed, to a
fall in commercial imports from and a strong increase in exports to these
countries, obviously to cover payments for military equipment. The deficit vis-
à-vis Western Europe and the United States in 1968 was cut down to £E66
million, which was more than covered by the transfers received from other
Arab countries as compensation for the loss of revenues-from the Suez Canal.
The reduction of the deficit with Western Europe and the United States was
accomplished exclusively through a substantial reduction of imports from
these countries. Thus, in 1968—69 Egypt, for the first time since World War II,
found herself with a trade surplus.16
Beginning with that year, however, GDP started recovering. The growth
rate was 5.9 percent in 1968—69, 6.9 percent in 1969—70, and 4.8 in 1970—71.
Agricultural production played an important part in the recovery, and it would
seem that the returns from the Aswan High Dam began to materialize at that
time. From 1967 to 1969, the FAO index of total agricultural production rose
by 12 percent. The uptrend continued over the following two years at a slower
rate, with an increase of little more than 4 percent, but, the overall increase
for the five-year period from 1966 to 1971 did reach about 25 percent, or
some 5percentper year. By comparative standards this is quite a substantial
rate of growth for agriculture. It should also be recalled that the normal
growth rate of Egyptian agriculture had been about 2½ percent; the additional
2½ percent per year, therefore, was almost certainly the result of the High
Dam. Since the dam had originally been expected to increase total agricultural
output by some 20 percent, this means that almost two-thirds of the expected
increase (12½ percentage points out of 20) had materialized by 1971. Fertil-
izer shortages related to the destruction of some industries and the decline of
imports may have inhibited faster agricultural growth in these years, notably
because the High Dam itself meant a strong increase in fertilizer requirements.
More important from our point of view is the fact that industrial pro-
duction recovered, too, despite the destruction of important industrial plants.
After a decline in 1967—68 of 5 or 6 percent in industrial value added, an
increase of 12 percent in 1968—69 brought industrial production 5 percent
above the pre-1967 War level. Since this recovery took place in the face of122 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
capital goods and raw materials imports in 1967 and 1968 running at only
two-thirds of the average for 1965 and 1966, it is hard to believe that sup-
plies of imported capital goods and raw materials could have been the decisive
factor in limiting industrial growth during the years immediately before the war.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM'7
Initially, the nationalizations of 1961 changed little in the formal setup of
exchange and trade controls. Exchange control continued to be supervised by
a Supreme Committee for Foreign Exchange, set up by the Minister of the
Economy. Laws, decrees, and instructions issued by the latter were imple-
mented by a Director of Exchange Operations. Technical problems were left
to the Central Exchange Control attached to the Central Bank of Egypt.
Commodity exports were controlled by a special Export Board. In prin-
ciple, they continued to be free of licensing, and, as mentioned earlier, some
exports of fruits and vegetables actually remained in private hands. However,
most foreign sales were now handled by public enterprises, and exports of cot-
ton could take place only through the intermediary of the Egyptian Cotton
Commission.
All imports required licenses by the Import Control Office. Imports were
largely effected through state organizations, which initially had to apply for
licenses to import. Government departments could import directly, but state
import organizations as well as industrial firms had to submit applications
to the appropriate ministry, which scrutinized each application in relation 40
the foreign exchange budget (see below) and forwarded it to the Import Con-
trol Office. The imports of industrial firms were limited to their own require-
ments of raw materials, parts, and equipment. Thus, there was no scope left
for imports by private traders, and as of August 1963, the right of private
industrial firms to import directly was also abolished.
Import licenses were issued within the framework of the foreign exchange
budget, drawn up by a Supreme Committee with members from the Central
Exchange Control, the Cotton Commission, and representatives from the minis-
tries of Industry and Planning. Initially, the Supreme Committee was only
expected to evaluate the foreign exchange budget estimates prepared by the
other exchange control authorities, but after 1962 it was directly in charge
of the allocation of foreign exchange. The intent was to keep imports within
the limits of export performance and the availability of foreign loans, and to
coordinate the allocation of foreign exchange with the expenditures under the
overall government budget, which included the gross expenditure and revenue
of all state-owned enterprises from 1962 on.
The allocation process developed roughly as follows: In January the
Foreign Exchange Office of the Ministry of the Economy sent questionnairesADMiNISTRATION OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE SINCE 1961 123
to the various state organizations and firms, requesting details about their
production requirements for imported raw materials and capital equipment
for the next fiscal year. On the basis of these questionnaires a foreign exchange
budget was drawn up after extensive bargaining between the various authorities
and organizations. The allocations were made according to the type of goods
to be imported, the type of currency required for payment, and the method
of settlement. Allocation of foreign exchange to an importer was accompanied
by an import license, and the import transaction was initially carried out by
the licensee. However, import licenses became superfluous, since private traders
and private industrial firms (beginning with 1963) were not allowed to import.
Licensing was therefore abolished as of October 1964.
In October 1964 the economy was divided (administratively) into a
number of major sectors. Each was allotted a total amount of foreign exchange
by the budget of the Supreme Committee, but it was left to the authorities
(ministries) at the top of each sector to determine the detailed allocation within
it. These authorities also determined whether imports should be made directly
by themselves or left to the (state-owned) import organizations. A special
bank was attached to each sector to take care of the technical matters pertain-
ing to import payments. These changes implied a certain degree of decentraliza-
tion of the allocation system, with the aim of placing the responsibility for
investment, production, and import decisions with the same authority.
Within the framework of the annual budget, the foreign exchange alloca-
tions to the main sectors were first made on a weekly basis by a special Inter-
ministerial Committee. The total amount allocated each week equaled the
actual exchange earnings of the previous week minus foreign debt obligations
and other payments for invisibles falling due in the following week.
A system as myopic as that could hardly be expected to work in a satis-
factory way. For instance, it would seem to link sectoral allocation of foreign
exchange to the seasonalities of exports and debt servicing, but how this, in
turn, affected allocations within the sectors is not known to us. The system
was changed in the following year—1965—to one of less frequent periodic
allocations, but operated on the basis of the same kind of simple arithmetic
as that of the weekly system. A step in the direction of increased centraliza-
tion was taken later, when it was decided that a central financing committee
should meet periodically to decide upon import transactions recommended by
the sectors for the period under consideration and within the given, periodic
foreign exchange allocation. The intention was obviously to permit appraisal
of the relative need for foreign exchange among the various sectors. It should
be added that the annual foreign exchange budget continued to set fixed annual
quotas for each particular sector, but what precise relation the foreign ex-
change budget had to the periodic allocations of foreign exchange and import
approvals is not clear.
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of1961. The Ministry of Defense had top priority along with the Ministry
of Supply (in charge of basic foods). Next in line came raw materials, ma-
chinery, and parts. How allocations were made the main sectors during
the period of decentralization in 1964 and 1965 is not known, though the
priorities were probably largely the same. It is clear, however, that actual
allocation was greatly influenced by bargaining among parties of unequal bar-
gaining power, and that all kinds of imponderabilia, from ministers' whims
and personal favoritism to baksheesh, played their role.
It should also be emphasized that construction of new plants financed
through special arrangements with foreign sources and, of course, purchases
of weapons fell outside the foreign exchange allocation system just described.
No information is available on the import requests of the various sectors
and the extent to which they were satisfied, but we have compiled a partial
list of quotas actually allocated by the Foreign Exchange Budget to the minis-
tries and government authorities in the fiscal year 1963—64 (Table 5—7). The
TABLE 5-7
Foreign Exchange Quotas Allocated to Various Ministries and Organizations







Ministry of Industry .
(raw materials, industrial equipment,
spare parts) 105 76 29
Ministry of Agriculture
(seeds, pesticides,
agric. equipment, livestock) 14 12 2
Ministry of Supply
(wheat, tea, coffee,
fertilizer, sugar, etc.) 105 27 78
Ministry of Housing
(steel and electrical equipment,
drainage and sewage requirements) 7 3 4
Transportation 4 3 1
Pharmaceutical Organization 14 13 1
Petroleum Authority 28 22 6
Agricultural Organization
(fertilizer and seeds) 4 3 1
Total 281 159 122
SOURCE: M. S. Mourad and F. Moursy, The Foreign Exchange Budget and the
Exterior Financing of Development, Cairo, 1967, pp. 206—208.ADMINISTRATION OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE SINCE 1961 125
total amounts to £E281 million (67 percent of all imports), which exceeds
exports for that year million) by roughly the service surplus
million). However, to these import allocations one ihould add capital goods
imported in implementation of the investment program for new plants, as well
as imports of consumer goods (such as woolen textiles, furniture wood, appli-
ances, and automobiles) allocated directly to government agencies. Moreover,
to the £E135 million deficit on current account in 1963—64, foreign payments
obligations on capital account amounting to £E54.6 million should be added.
Against this, foreign loans of £E148.1 million were available (including
£E75.5 million under PL480), leaving an overall deficit of £E41.5 million.
This deficit, maintained at that level until 1966, had then to be covered ad
hoc by short-term credits and postponement of foreign debt service obligations.
The Supreme Committee, thus, does not seem to have had the authority to
balance its budget, and lack of power in negotiating with ministries and
organizations may have confronted it with an impossible task.
APPRAISAL OF THE SYSTEM'S PERFORMANCE
Any attempt to appraise the performance of the administration of foreign trade
and exchange after 1961 runs into two basic problems. Information about the
actual working of the administrative machinery is scarce and may. not really
be sufficient to evaluate what was going on. In any case, a standard of com-
parison has to be chosen, and it is not obvious what this standard should
be. Before proceeding, therefore, we have to make up our minds in this regard.
The information we have been able to collect about the administrative
machinery summed up above does not amount to much more than a crude
outline of the organizational setup. We could have added some more details
of the same type, giving lists of state-owned trade agencies and organizations,
et cetera, but this would hardly contribute to answering the basic question of
how the machinery worked and how well or badly it performed. Indeed, such
detail might help prejudice the analysis; for there is probably a tendency to
assume that the larger a bureaucratic machinery is, given the problems to be
solved, the worse it works. But that does not necessarily follow. Bureaucratic
machinery may have an optimal size and may thus be too small, too. More-
over, with any system there is a concomitant bureaucracy. Even the "market
forces" have their office employees and the less-than-perfect markets have
many of them. It is only in abstract theory that perfect market forces as
such do not use up resources and do not depend for their performances on
the capabilities of these resources.18 Once it has been decided; therefore, to
replace private enterpreneurship with state ownership and not to depend on
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another allocative machinery, another bureaucracy. The mere fact that the new
bureaucracy is larger than the old one does not prove that the new system
is less efficient.
Connoisseurs of Egyptian bureaucracy may, at this point, smile and ask
whether these are not fairly superfluous rites in the name of academic ob-
jectivity. After all, would anybody acquainted with Egyptian bureaucracy be
in doubt about the answer? The authors, who have long personal experience
with Egyptian bureaucracy, do not suffer from illusions in this regard1° but
feel, nevertheless, that some caution is warranted. First, there is a clear ten-
dency in the economics profession, particularly in the United States, to take it
for granted that any market system, however imperfect, is better than any
other system. Second, private enterprise and market forces in Egypt were
never perfect; they performed only reasonably well under the umbrella of a
government that was always at their disposal and ready to bail out losers, be
it through protective measures, support in the cotton futures market, or other-
wise. In the case of Egypt (as anywhere else, of course) the choice is between
(highly) imperfect systems, and we do not think that it is obvious a priori
which one is preferable.
These considerations lead us directly to the basis of comparison. The
reader will already have understood that we do not think that a system should
be condemned just because it demonstrably fails to imply a perfect theoretical
Pareto optimum or convergence toward such an optimum. No existing system
is known to succeed in that unfailingly. The only basis of comparison that
makes sense is the hypothetical performance of a realistic alternative system
that could conceivably operate in Egypt. We know of at least one such system
—that which preceded the one introduced in 1961. To choose that system
as a basis of comparison has the great advantage that we do not need to
hypothesize about its possible performance: we know what it was. Hence, we
shall simply compare performance during the two five-year periods 1956—
1961 and 1962—1967, and see which period made the better showing. The
objection might be raised that the transition to the present system already be-
gan in the first of these two periods: important nationalizations took place in
connection with the Suez War (nationalization of the canal itself, with a num-
ber of British- and French-owned companies, particularly in the field of fi-
nance); the purely domestic Misr Bank, the center of the Misr concern, was
nationalized in 1960; and, in general, government activities in investments
were increasing during the entire period. Hence it might be more interesting
to go further back in time when private entrepreneurship was still unchal-
lenged. Disregarding the immediate postwar years when the economy was still
dominated by war controls, their dismantling, and the recovery of the economy,
this would lead us to take as our point of reference the period from around
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this period is dominated by the Korean boom and post-Korean recession and
therefore can hardly be termed characteristic of the private enterprise system.
The Balance of Payments Deficit.
We emphasize first that the extraordinary increase in the balance of pay-
ments deficit after 1961, with the subsequent payments collapse, should not
be taken as proof, or even as an indicator, of the inferiority of the present
system. It was the logical, direct result of the ambitious targets for economic
policy formulated by the government during the years 1960 to 1962, as
we already noted in our discussion of the 1962 devaluation. The five-year plan
of 1960—61 to 1964—65, Arab socialism, and the involvement in the Yemen
war implied targets for gross investments, private consumption and public
consumption far beyond the expansion of GNP. It is not clear whether this
was understood by those who set these targets. Indeed, it-is by no means clear
whether target setting during these years was performed with any considera-
tion of the problem of consistency. The men who pushed the first five-year
plan and its investment targets (El Boghdady and El Kaisouni, among others)
were not the same individuals as those who pushed for Arab socialism, with
its consumption effects (Mi Sabri and his entourage). Also, the rise in de-
fense expenditure may have been an unexpected consequence of the Yemen
war (which was the president's personal responsibility and was initially ex-
pected to be brief and painless), much as the increase in U.S. defense expendi-
ture in 1966 came unexpectedly as a consequence of the escalation of the
Vietnam war. Furthermore, the president, upon whom the ultimate
about these matters rested both formally and de facto, may not have been
correctly informed about the implications of these ambitious targets. Given
the targets, however, the "system" had no choice but to increase the payments
deficit and do its best to finance it.
The dangers of this policy were comprehended at the lower levels of
government at an early stage, and the Treasury as well as the Central Bank
tried to get messages through to the president in this connection. Whether
these did not reach him, he did not take notice of them, or whether he thought
that he would be able to continue playing off the United States and the Soviet
Union against each other2° and thus obtain financing beyond what the Trea-
sury and the Central Bank thought realistic or justified is not known. As long
as the two powers agreed to play the game, the payments problems were over-
come. But when first the Soviet Union, in 1964 (when Khrushchev refused to
postpone High Dam loan payments), and one year afterwards the United
States (abrogating PL480 sales) backed out, the potential inconsistency im-
mediately became an established fact and targets had to be sacrificed.
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realisticand the export performance, against this background, entirely in-
adequate for financing the import requirements of the economy at a satisfactory
rate of growth, these are failures for which the top decision makers rather than
the administrative system as such should be blamed.
Given the public sector's expenditure targets and the government's wage,
tax-subsidy, and exchange rate policies, any system would run into balance of
payments difficulties. Whether it would have been possible under another and
better allocation system to realize the general expenditure targets at lower
balance of payments deficits, either by maintaining production increases at
lower import levels or, at given levels of imports, by increasing production and
exports is another matter. This is largely a matter of production efficiency,
the problem we are turning to now.
Resource Allocation.
Productivity data certainly point to inefficiency in production. While
productivity per man-hour in industrial enterprises with ten employees and
more increased by 4 percent per year from 1952 to 1960,21 and faster in the
second than in the first half of this period, there does not seem to have been
any increase at all in industrial labor productivity after 1961.22 To some ex-
tent the decline in labor productivity may reflect overemployment created
first by the government's employment drive of 1961 (yet another ambitious
policy target related to Arab socialism), when public enterprises were forced
to employ workers beyond their needs, and after 1965 by the slack in demand
which, as in any other system, tends to create labor redundancies. However,
the increasing complexities of the bureaucratic system, deterioration of man-
agement, commodity shortages, and disciplinary difficulties—all directly or
indirectly related to the change in the system—probably did much to keep
down labor productivity. And if these circumstances had harmful effects on
labor productivity, it stands to reason that they also had harmful effects on the
productivity of other inputs, including imports.
There is the further question whether the corn position of domestic pro-
duction became more or less suboptimal during the1 960s—the allocation
problem of neoclassical theory.23 Did explicit and implicit price distortions
increase or decrease? This matter will be discussed in some detail in the fol-
lowing chapters on agriculture and industry. A clear answer is difficult to
give, however, because we are confronted not only with direct price distortions
and trade controls—which certainly 'did increase—but also with government
interference with domestic production patterns. Our tentative conclusion on
the basis of the following chapters is that resource allocation in both agri-
culture and manufacturing industry deteriorated during the 1960s.
The problem is closely related to that of the level of foreign trade, or,ADMINISTRATION OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE SINCE 1961 129
given the deficits, the level of exports or imports. In Chapter 1 (Chart 1—1)
we presented exports and imports as percentages of GDP at current market
prices. The important feature in the present context is the clear downward
trend of exports in relation to GDP from the time of the Korean boom until
around 1963; from that year on the level is approximately constant.
Before World War II, exports seem to have been about 15 or 16 percent
of GDP. Immediately after the war the percentage was low, but it recovered
quickly. After the high export prices of the Korean boom years had subsided,
the export level in 1952 was about the same as before World War II. From
then on the share was shrinking until 1963 (the very low levels of 1961 and
1962 should be disregarded here, since they were the result of the cotton crop
failure in 1961). The gradual (cyclical and structural) depreciation during the
1950s (Chapter 3) was clearly insufficient to stop, let alone reverse, the down-
trend in the share of exports. In that respect the system after 1961 actually
performed better—at least it stopped the downward trend. But by then exports
had reached a very low level, and it was partly the rise in cotton and rice
prices on the international markets that halted the decline. A volume index
for exports shows an increase of 40 percent from 1956 to 1960 and of only
25 percent from 1960 to 1966. The corresponding unit value index fell by
6 percent between 1956 and 1960 and rose by 10 percent between 1960
and 1966.24
Assuming the level of exports in 1952—53 (the same as before World
War 11) to have been about optimal under free trade, given the deficits, the
falling level of exports during the 1950s could have only been optimal if the
concurrent downward trend in imports had been optimal. The fact that import
licensing gained in importance during this period and commodity shortages
began to appear is probably sufficient corroboration of the hypothesis that
imports were running at an increasingly suboptimal level. In addition, some
ill-advised import substitution took place in manufacturing (the steel works in
Heiwan being the most important example), but the removal of export taxes
in agriculture and the increasing evasion of area controls (Chapter 6) worked
in the opposite direction. All things considered, our judgment is that the
optimal level of imports in 1961 as a percentage of GDP, given the deficit,
may have been about the same as, or even higher than, in 1952—53. It follows
that exports were running at too low a level in 1961 (even disregarding the
cotton crop failure).
The roughly unchanged level of exports after 1962—63 was accompanied
by an increase in the balance of payments deficit and a sharp rise in imports.
If now, starting from an optimal situation with balanced foreign payments,
the government decided to run a balance of payments deficit, imports should
have increased and exports decreased (unless there were inferior goods), at
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imports soared from 1962 onwards, the export level, ceteris paribus, must
have become less suboptimal. The development of exports by commodity
groups points in the same direction; (see Table 5—4).Thegovernment's
export efforts during the 1960s were concentrated on rice and cotton textiles.
The expansion of rice production and exports was certainly a move in the
direction of better resource allocation (Chapter 7), and so was probably the
expansion of textile production (Chapter 8). The fall in the export of other
manufactured goods was mainly the consequence of the exhaustion of oil wells.
However, despite these efforts, it seems pretty clear that the level of exports
was too low during the whole period of the l960s, even granted the size of
the deficits. If that is true, there must also have been some loss of efficiency,
and with better resource allocation the targets could have been fulfilled at a
higher level of trade with a smaller deficit.
In conclusion, the economic system is not export-oriented; exports are
simply viewed as necessary to pay for imports. Neither have exports been
designated as a specific target supported by a planning machinery, nor have
they been actively promoted abroad. Indeed, they have often served as a
buffer to domestic supply fluctuations. The adaptation of domestic products
to foreign specifications, particularly with regards to packaging and grading,
has been virtually nonexistent, and only recently have some efforts been made
in this direction.25 This deficiency may be odd for an economy long based on
exports of cotton, but even here there are strong indications that export pro-
motion has not been pursued thoroughly and has often succumbed to con-
siderations of self-sufficiency, diversification, and equitable income distribution.
Problems of Foreign Exchange
The changes made in the foreign exchange allocation system in 1962,
1964, 1965, and 1966 reflect all the difficulties such allocation systems face.
Although, to work rationally, a system must be comprehensive and cover
all sources of demand and supply, Egypt's foreign exchange allocations to
defense and new plants and other projects remained outside the system even
after 1962, while orders from the top could always supersede existing
allocations.
Foreign exchange budgets, indispensable for administrative exchange
allocation, have been in existence since 1957. The budgets seem to have
systematically overestimated foreign exchange availabilitiesin relation to
requirements. One reason may have been the lack of comprehensiveness, but
inadequate forecasting methods may also have been at fault. The survey
method, apparently the major forecasting device, does not work well when
the surveyed enterprises, organizations, and authorities know that their answers
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overstated. Although the budget may try to adjust for such a bias, doing so
correctly requires long experience with the survey method in this particular
field. The tendency for imports of raw materials and and inventories of
such inputs, to increase more than production (for which we have given some
evidence) could be a consequence of this kind of bias in the surveys. It is
more difficult to know how replies to questions about future foreign exchange
earnings would be biased. Exaggerated statements could be expected from
enterprises and organizations if the import allocating authorities were known
to discriminate in favor of foreign exchange earners—which, in fact, they
probably were. Management may also have a personal career interest in draw-
ing up a rosy picture of the future. With upward biases in both requirements
and expected earnings, it is easy to imagine a situation where excessive import
licenses are issued and unexpected foreign exchange shortages arise.
Under such circumstances it is tempting to supplement the annual foreign
exchange budget with a primitive "cash flow" system by which any dollar is
allocated at the moment it is earned but never before. The weekly allocation
system adopted in October 1964 came close to a completely synchronized
earnings-allocation system. Such a system is foolproof in the sense that it does
not allocate more than has been earned, but only if it is comprehensive—
which this system was not. In addition, it rules out all possibility for optimal
allocation over time, at least if it is applied at-all stages of allocation. And it
does not, of course, solve the problem of allocation between users. If, for
instance, the weekly allocations simply applied the proportions of the annual
allocations in the budget, by the end of the year all users would have received
the same x percent of their annual allocations; this is not necessarily a rational
way of adjusting the annual budget. The change to a system with less frequent
"cash flow" allocations in 1965 was obviously a compromise between annual
budgeting and mechanical synchronization.
It appears that improvement in Egypt's exchange allocation administra-
tion partly hinges upon the development of better forecasting methods for
demand and supply of foreign exchange. The short-term forecasting methods
used in highly developed countries could presumably be adapted for this
purpose. But it should be emphasized that, even under free trade, exports and
imports tend to be difficult to forecast and that, even with the best possible
forecasting methods, a substantial foreign exchange reserve may be indis-
pensable as a shock absorber. Certainly, forecasting trade with Communist
countries gives rise to special problems that, we think, nobody has tackled
so far.
Centralization versus decentralization was another problem encountered
in Egypt during these years. The decentralization move in 1964, when the
economy was divided into sectors that were allotted lump sums of exchange
to be allocated within an individual sector by the sector's own authority, was
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clearly undertaken to enable each sector to coordinate its decisions in regard
to production and allocation of both domestic and imported inputs. But this
system left open the problem of coordination the various sectors, which
probably explains the switch back to centralization in 1966 whereby the indi-
vidual sector's detailed allocation of its overall quota had to go back to the
central organ for approval. The government may have hoped to combine the
advantages of centralization and decentralization in this way; the paper work
must certainly have increased.
One of the basic shortcomings since 1961 in the Egyptian system is that
it has never succeeded in formulating clear, simple, operational allocation
criteria to replace those of private profit maximization, be it in long-term invest-
ment planning or in short-term commodity allocation. Hence the vacillation
between centralization and decentralization. It would probably help greatly
if the government could formulate such criteria—and stick to them; they
might come close to private profit maximization, arid, if so, the whole problem
of relying upon price mechanisms to a larger extent than at present would
naturally have to be reconsidered.
Our discussion in this section is not very conclusive. It does, however,
indicate that—even apart from the basic targets—the administrative systems
after 1961 were less efficient than the earlier system in the areas of production
and imports. In exports the performance may have been better, although it was
far from satisfactory. The possibilities of substantial improvements in the
present administrative system are evident. Given such improvements, it is not
clearto us which system would prove superior in the long run, particularly if
weapons purchases continue to necessitate substantial trade with Communist
countries.
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